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Abstract There is increasing interest in the EU about the central place of eIdentity
(eID) in people’s lives. eID is increasingly seen as a bridge between the commercial
viability of models based on large-scale provision of e-services and users’ need for
privacy and security in online transactions. This paper examines technological, social
and legal developments in the field of eID and asks whether there is the need for a new
regulatory framework that both preserves users’ identity and enables the provision of
advanced services. Firstly, the paper interprets recent market moves in the eID field as a
response to a rising regulatory tide. Secondly, it examines some of the challenges arising
from Web2.0, and four emerging socio-legal issues associated with eID—behavioural
profiling, social engineering, redlining and other unsocial practices. Thirdly, the paper
examines the capacity of the current regulatory framework to absorb this turbulence, and
finds it wanting. Finally, it advances a novel model of eID regulation that may help
regulators create an identity-preserving, transaction-friendly eID environment.
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The eID market in the face of rising regulation
The year 2008 marked a turning point when major industrial eID players aimed at
positioning themselves favourably in the face of increased attention by policy-
makers, public worry about personal data and a striking string of data breaches in
public and private sector. Google, a major player in the eID field, has become
increasingly vocal and apparently proactive on privacy, user control and data
retention. A number of large players have joined OpenID after initial scepticism.1
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1See the OpenID 2008 timeline at http://openid.net/2009/01/15/momentum/; also see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/OpenID
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OpenID has been set as a parallel identification mechanism for HealthVault,
Microsoft’s flagship in e-health. Again in 2008, the Information Card Foundation, a
consortium of Equifax, Google, Microsoft, Novell, Oracle and PayPal stepped up
industry action regarding card authentication. In June 2008 Liberty Alliance made
available the Identity Assurance Framework (IAF) and the Identity Governance
Framework (IGF) to their members. IAF is a global standard framework for
validating trusted identity assurance service providers based on a uniform definition
of the security and privacy risks associated with different levels of identity
assurance. IGF is a declarative policy framework for managing identity flows
within organizations motivated by regulatory requirements, such as those set by the
Data Protection Directive;2 it creates a standard for defining enterprise-level policies
and controls for consumer consent for sharing sensitive personal information,
including personally identifiable information (Liberty Alliance 2008). In October
2008 a user-centric ‘identity meta-system’ was proposed by a consortium including
IBM and Microsoft which features significantly enhanced privacy and user-control
with respect to the original Microsoft vision. The eID industry is fully represented in
the EU-funded large scale project STORK,3 aiming at creating interoperable public
administration identities across EU member states (November 2008). A consensus
seems to be developing that privacy is core to any new developments in identity
management (e- and otherwise) and on the need to factor in privacy (social,
technical, legal) early at the design stage of systems and applications (Hansen et al.
2008), especially in federated identity environments (Squicciarini et al. 2008).
This consensus hardly bears on identification alone; rather, it aims to shelter the
large prospected revenues from the provision of advanced e-services from growing
regulatory pressure, uncertainty and threat. Also, it aims to self-regulate and self-
organise to overcome some of the industrial and systemic barriers in the identity
management system sector to the development of such services (Maghiros et al.
2007). Apparently confiding in integrated technological solutions and counting on
users’ willingness to strike a Faustian deal between provision of personal data and
fruition of advanced e-services, industry players fear legal barriers the most. Most
world e-service companies in healthcare, finance and retail name “compliance with
regulations” as the main challenge in the years ahead (Google 2008).
This concern with compliance is not misplaced. Regulators are paying increasing
attention to identity, privacy and trust in online and converging environments
(Edwards and Fieschi 2008). Understanding and regulating identity in a ubiquitous
information environment is a major driver of the future internet economy (OECD
2008). A number of studies were commissioned by policy makers (OECD, Council
of Europe, European Commission) to clarify the economic and legal implications of
digital personhood (Rundle et al. 2007), of eID profiling for human rights (Dinant et
al. 2008) and of self-regulation in the privacy market (Marcus et al. 2007). These
domains let envisage an increasingly complex regulation model of individuals’
identity management.
2 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
3 Secure Identity Across Borders Linked; STORK is funded under the ICT Policy Support Programme.
See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/apps/projects/factsheet/index.cfm?project_ref=224993
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In the European Union, this model begins to extend to consumer policy, as
location and service fruition and trust and privacy are seen as prerequisites for the
common digital market to come (Kuneva 2008); to human rights policy, in relation
to the consequences of advanced profiling techniques (Dinant et al. 2008) and with
issues of surveillance in relation to information society security (Hammarberg 2008);
to online safety policy, especially in relation with younger users (EDPS 2008b); and
to a set of policies regarding the economic impact of networks to come (OECD
2008). If fully sketched, eID may need a grander, more integrated regulatory
framework than the one that to date responds mainly to the identity-theft threat
(cybercrime), requiring one that ensures smooth services fruition across the member
states (interoperability) and that shields people privacy from intrusion and abuse
(data protection).
Partly, the increasing complexity is due to the significant identity-related
technological developments. The technological referents of eID are growing in
number and complexity; the 2008–2009 work programme of the Article 29 Working
Party4 plans tackling open questions related to individuals and search engines, social
networking sites, behavioural profiling and data mining (on- and off-line),
biometrics, ubiquitous computing and Ambient Intelligence, and Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) (Article 29 Working Party 2008). One recent trend in particular
presents challenges for the regulation and management of workable eID models: the
rise of Web2.0.
Identity and web2.0
Web 2.0 refers to ‘social’ e-applications such as social networking services (SNSs),
e.g. Facebook), collaborative filtering (Amazon, Last.FM), social bookmarking (del.
icio.us), folksonomies (Flickr), social search engines (yoono.com), file sharing
(Emule), mash-ups (BBC backstage), and online multi-player games (World of
Warcraft). In recent years, Web2.0 has become very popular especially with young
Internet users. In Europe, about a third of Internet users engage in some way with
Web2.0. Some 10% provide feedback, post comments on blogs and reviews on
Amazon. About 10% share contents on Flickr, YouTube. Only around 3% of Internet
users in Europe are creating new contents (Pascu et al. 2008).
Web2.0 raises important issues in relation to identity, trust, reputation, co-
operation and privacy. One issue relates to identification, as virtually all Web2.0
systems mentioned require simple email ID and password identification. This leads
to the multiplication of identification across multiple sites, limited security of
transactions based on password identification, with potential for data loss,
4 The "Article 29 Data Protection Working Party" (set up by Article 29 of European Directive 95/46/EC)
is a working party composed of representatives of the data protection authorities in the Member States of
the European Union, representatives of the Community’s supervisory authorities and one representative of
the European Commission. It aims to provide expert opinion from member states to the Commission on
questions of data protection, to promote the uniform application of the general principles of the Directive
in all Member States, to advise the Commission on Community privacy and data protection measures and
to make recommendations to the public and to Community institutions. See http://ec.europa.eu/
justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/index_en.htm
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impersonation and identity theft as the extreme consequence. Within the sites, plug-
ins and applications written by third parties endanger users’ privacy (Felt and Evans
2007). Some providers, such as MySpace.com, are currently considering biometric
(fingerprint) technology enrolment and validation systems for underage users of SNS
(NA 2008). Overall, there seems to be a movement towards increased security and
questioning of the portability of secure identity across multiple domains.
Furthermore, certain ‘special’ characteristics of Web2.0 challenge regulation of
behaviour as they are to all effects cultural markets. In short, when people come
together to share their knowledge, reputation, consumer experiences and tastes,
identity becomes negotiable. Establishing identity, the act of making oneself known,
becomes socially bound, allowing multiple presentation of the self across
heterogeneous platforms (DiMicco and Millen 2007). Identity also becomes
relational (you are what you link, purchase, post), becomes portable, as identity
data is becoming increasingly portable. Trust subsumed to transactions also becomes
portable (my friends’ friends are my friends, my friends tastes are my tastes, etc). In
these Web2.0 ‘places’, masses of user generated contents (hence identity and trust)
are manipulated according to different logics (Thomas 2006). User generated
content, the source of collective intelligence that most observers consider as a key
characteristics of Web2.0 applications is channelled by logics based on proprietary
algorithms (Allen 2008). These logics help mould specific regimes of trust, identity
and privacy and are perceived differently by different generational cohorts.
Examples of these logics span the production / consumption continuum of social
computing (see Appendix). In other words, Web2.0 enables distributed systems of
trust-making, distributed systems of identity making and complex reputation systems
where users interact with rules. The purposeful behaviour of users makes the game a
strategic one, even where negative behaviour is discouraged.
Overall, these Web2.0 logics are vicarious both to the legal framework for the
fruition of e-services and to the regulation of identity in ‘real life’. To these logics
people become easily accustomed. These logics shape suggested morphologies of
eID, whereby it is more or less convenient to share information about one’s tastes,
identity, personal behaviour, orientation, and relations as well; these morphologies
constrain users’ perceptions and behaviour in manifesting identity online (by
engaging in the exchange, generation and reception of data flows). Below, we
discuss three specific challenges proper to this new environment: personal data
proliferation, traceability and unsocial practices.
Personal data proliferation
Unprecedented amounts of user information are generated in countless online and
offline interactions, most of which is beyond user control. Less than half of the
digital universe related to users is accounted for by their activities—pictures taken,
phone calls, emails—while “the rest constitutes a digital ‘shadow’—surveillance
photos, Web search histories, financial transaction journals, mailing lists” (Gantz et
al. 2008, p. 2). If these are systematically harvested, they can return to haunt users
along with delivering targeted services via Web and Web2.0 (Story 2008a, b);
especially, this may happen when data-points from different sources, such as search
engines and Web2.0, are brought together (Zimmer 2008). The Google-Doubleclick
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merger may open new scenarios and new legal challenges concerning online
‘behaviour tracking’. In short: linking of Internet Service Provider (ISP) data with
cookies data, with information from ‘social’ spaces of search engines lead to an
unprecedented amount of collated information about single users. The recent case of
Phorm well illustrates this point.5
Traceability
The linking of digital context and content to physical location is one of the defining traits
of Web2.0 (e.g. geo-tagging, geographical data meshing); in fact, mobile social
computing is increasingly seen as the next market trend in the mobile field (Feijoo et
al. 2009). A number of emerging technologies, such as location-based services, IPv6,
third generation mobile phones and RFID establish even stronger links between
physical location and digitised knowledge about people. With the integration of sensors
in everyday life, the boundaries between physical and digital space will become
increasingly difficult to distinguish (Daskala and Maghiros 2007). Mobile phones and
mobility present newer challenges for data protection and eID safety, in relation to
highly mobile identity, the mobile being a very personal device, easy to intrude and to
track. Surveillance problems will be enhanced by IPv6, which links personal digital
devices and information/communications. Privacy problems may arise from the
creation of networks to manage billions of tags at global level (e.g. EPCGlobal
system).6 RFID can potentially violate privacy and enable a control of persons (e.g.
profiling, verification of tracks, control of geographical position). Overall, the greater
dimensionality of digital identity conferred by location and mobility technologies
makes it much easier to ‘overkill’ with digital information: not to use proportionate
technologies or minimal data for the aims of the personal identity data processing.
Unsocial practices
New media provide enhanced ammunition for social engineering and phishing
(Workman 2008), notwithstanding strong technical security as very often the weak
link of the chain is human. Through more or less sophisticated persuasion
techniques, the social engineer can persuade people to communicate information
which—alone or in combination with further information—can give access to
sensitive sources such as bank account and credit card numbers. Increasingly, also,
unsocial online practices do not infringe the law, but may create a great deal of
discomfort to those on the receiving end. Information from social networking sites is
increasingly used as evidence to screen job and university applicants, possibly
5 Phorm is a company liaising between ISPs and advertisers, data mining user session files to provide
advertising companies with intelligence as to users' tastes, to favour the provision of context-sensitive
advertising. Although Phorm maintains that its technical arrangements shield users' identity, the
compliance of this system with Data Protection law was called into question by the Foundation for
Information Policy Research (http://www.fipr.org/080317icoletter.html). Phorm is currently under scrutiny
by the UK Information Commissioner regarding issues of Data Protection and EU and national laws
regarding pseudonymity and interception (http://ww.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2008/
phorm_statement.pdf).
6 See http://www.epcglobalinc.org/home
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prejudicing future reputation and career (Bennett 2008); cyber-bullying is on the
rise, whereby young and older adults are targeted online and offline (Hammond
2007); cases of suicide in relation to SNS campaign of harassment have been
reported (Davies 2007). Harassment involving SNS have been before the courts; in
one case, a man was cleared of harassing his ex-girlfriend over Facebook, saying
prosecutors had not proven that he used a Facebook friend request to harass
(Williams 2008). In another case, a man was jailed after a Facebook friend request
he made violated a previous restraining order (Clout 2007). In other words, online
actions revolving around the boundaries of digital identity may have significant
offline consequences, many of which, however, remain uncharted.
The EU legal framework and eID
This turbulence created by technological developments is, of course, mediated and
absorbed by existing regulation. Overall, EU citizens enjoy a significant degree of
protection of personal data, privacy and ultimately identity. Personal identity is a
constitutionally protected right. It is closely linked to the right to respect for private
and family life, as it shields people from unwanted external attention and control
(Rodotà 1997). The right to personal identity encompasses two of EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights: the right to privacy, which prevents public authorities from
privacy-invasive measures unless certain conditions are met, and the right to data
protection, which establish conditions under which it is legitimate and lawful to
process personal data. In Europe, a number of Directives have created a general and
technology neutral system7 of data protection in all Member States that also protects
‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons’ (Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 1).
“Not only privacy but other rights such as fairness, defence, non-discrimination
are to be protected. This vision is especially important in relation to judicial
authorities, as in many cases it overlaps and complements other principles
enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR” (Rodotà 1997, pp. 605–606).
National and EU Data Protection institutions monitor personal data processing by
public and private institutions and individuals can access Courts to settle issue
related to the infringement of their data protection rights.
However efficient technology neutral regulation may be, identity-protection
legislation is tested by rapid technological developments and social change, as novel
issues and dimensions that remain elusive to ‘hard’ legislation (Daskala and
Maghiros 2007). The right to identity implies the “correct representation in each
context” and also an “integral representation of the person” (Rodotà 1997, pp. 605–
606), also to be intended in a diachronic sense. However, specifically in relation to
Web2.0, identity is no longer conceivable as a pre-existing, static datum but rather as
a dynamic, ongoing process of manifestation of the self in multiple transactions,
interactions and exchanges of data. While strictly speaking digital identity is
information about users of an information system and the techniques for their
identification (usually protected with an authentication system), in a broader sense it
7 http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/pid/17
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corresponds to the on-line or virtual identity of a person. Especially for young
people, ‘being digital’ is more than the mere electronic processing of personal data,
it encompasses a distinct online life, often implying multiple different digital
identities (for instance through multiple profiles on social networking sites).
As such, digital identity can be endangered by misrepresentation, de-
contextualisation, non-transparent flow of information. It can be distorted and
fragmented, as personal data are stored in several databases that provide a partial and
potentially endangering picture of the person reduced to the sum of its electronic
projections (Rodotà 2004, p. 141). More in general, the legal concept of personal
identity misrepresentation takes on new nuances that may be difficult to forecast and
regulate; digital identity can be under-represented (Frean 2008), over-represented
(time-wise), otherwise represented, presented out of context, stolen, concealed via
anonymity and pseudonyms (Campbell 2007; Koops 2005; Leenes et al. 2006).
Although these issues may not be new, the complexity of data protection in relation
to digital identities and the uncertainty regarding its application and enforcement are.
We flag here four problematic areas of the current regulatory framework:
complexity, uncertainty, responsibility and oversight.
Complexity
Firstly, complexity makes the problem qualitatively different. What is ‘personal’
remains to-date elusive in relation to digital environments. There is a clear problem
with contextualising what data requires protection, as law “does not distinguish
between personal data that affects or does not affect private life” (Daskala and
Maghiros 2007, p. 27). The distinction is important enough to merit detailed
discussion by Article 29 (Article 29 Working Party 2007).8 Data protection
legislation currently struggles to regulate digital tracks and trails, in truth digital
fragments of identity, which are left behind unintentionally or unknowingly, such as,
for instance, the IP address of origin of users. When it allows tracing a user, Article
29’s opinion is that it constitutes personal data, therefore falling under the provisions
of data protection legislation (Hogben 2007). Other instances remain more
controversial. Unclear domains include terms searched for in search engines. It is
unclear whether search terms are to be considered as data to be protected and who
the actual owner of such personal data is.9 There is lack of clarity concerning
behavioural information stored in cookies and information provided for social
purposes and ‘relational’ information, specifically in SNS. All these are remainders
of digital transactions that the user has no knowledge about, awareness of or control
on, often resulting from the design of the transaction under scrutiny.
Uncertainty
Secondly, there is a significant problem with uncertainty. The growth of person-
related information and user generated content make compliance and control more
8 Established under Article 29 of EU Directive 95/46/EC, it comprises national Data Protection
Commissioners from EU member states.
9 An Article 29 opinion on Search Engines and Privacy was released on 4 April 2008.
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difficult (Gantz et al. 2008; Pascu 2008).Whether identity data controllers should be
trusted has been recently questioned, when an increasing number of data breaches
are not reported to customers and potentially sensitive data are disclosed to third
parties (BBC 2008). Also, checking compliance with privacy and personal data rules
in the digital space is problematic, as often there is not enough transparency about
the outcome of such activities (Daskala and Maghiros 2007). Although institutions
are required to perform compliance audits regarding data protection and prior checks
in relation to privacy impact (audits tools are increasingly made available by national
Data Protection authorities)10 there is no guarantee that audits have been performed
thoroughly and that results are valid and reliable. National Data Protection officers
are confronted with the gigantic task to monitor hundreds of thousands of delegated
data controllers, private and public, within their generally wider remit which goes far
beyond a bureaucratic interpretation of the Data Protection Directive (Thomas 2008).
Responsibility
It is becoming increasingly harder to identify responsibility in complex identity
environments, due to the large control gap between data subjects and data
controllers. Users have limited control on their data when these are uploaded to a
electronic database system and transferred trans-nationally11 and limited control over
their data and connections in relation to data merging from different sources
(Kirkpatrick 2008). While about 70% of the online information is created by
individuals, companies are responsible for the security, privacy, reliability and
compliance of 85% of the digital universe (Gantz et al. 2008). Even the deletion of
personal data and trails left is problematic (Hogben 2007). The question may be
raised of whether links and relations are part of the self, or whether they belong to
the context where these are generated. The issue of whether people can rightfully
‘export’ their online social graph (their online friends, tastes, writings) to other sites
in currently unclear. Overall, it is unclear to what extent people can be held
accountable for the accuracy of their digital identity, whether one may posit a
burgeoning duty of care of one’s digital identity (e.g. maintain it safe) or to maintain
an accurate digital identity, alongside established rights of protection by institutions.
In other words, whether users are to some extent data controllers of their digital
identity.
Oversight
Furthermore, as oversight ensures efficacy of any regulatory framework, further
thought should be devoted to identifying what is the most appropriate supervision
source. The recent case of SNS regulation in Britain highlights a number of
competence criss-crosses, whereby the communication watchdog Ofcom12 is
10 E.g. http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/lbrouni_piastudy_
apph_eur_2910071.pdf
11 The French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) fined in May 2007 Tyco Healthcare France € 30,000 for
unlawful cross-border transfers of human resources data to Tyco's U.S. headquarters.
12 Ofcom is the UK national telecommunications regulator, see http://www.ofcom.org.uk/.
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concerned with safety and privacy of media contents of the sites, the Home Office is
concerned with safety for younger children and safety guidelines, the national
Information Commissioner’s Office is concerned with data protection, identity and
privacy matters, and courts are concerned with all that falls between the lines.
Furthermore, member state Data Protection Authorities operate in very different
business and political cultures and sensitivities, witness the Phorm case in Britain, the
biometric passport case in France,13 and the Italian tax disclosure case.14 At EU level,
the competence boundary between European Data Protection Supervisor and
European Ombudsman has been contentious for some time, partly addressed by a
memorandum of understanding (European Ombudsman & European Data Protection
Supervisor 2007). Furthermore, EDPS is now involved in assessing the privacy and
personal data consequences of project funded under the Seventh Framework
Programme for Research and Technology Development (FP7); the main aim is the
promotion and reinforcement of the ‘privacy by design’ in all stages of Information
Technologies EU-funded research (EDPS 2008a).
Is there a need for a new regulatory framework?
So far, we have identified a number of key challenges for eID. These revolve around
the need to re-assess identity to arrive at effective solutions to the turbulence
introduced by new developments. Overall, the principle challenge for regulators is to
enable the effective management of one’s own and, for businesses, one’s customers’
identity in a climate that tends to fragment its definition, use and regulation. Not
surprisingly, a key research challenge identified in the European Commission vision
of Future Internet relates to “Managing and protecting the ‘identity’ of billions of
networked persons, devices, “things”, services and virtual entities connected in the
Future Internet” (European Commission 2008b, p. 111).
To assist policy-making in managing and protecting eID, a more integral
approach to the problem may be required, one that takes into account users’ identity
across platforms and life activities. Research funded by the European Commission
under the FP7 IST programme include projects that favour a holistic view of identity
management, such as PRIMELIFE, SWIFT and PICOS15 (European Commission
2008a). Primelife aims to “fundamentally understand privacy-enhancing identity
management ‘for life’ (practical life, throughout life & beyond), to bring privacy to
the Web and its Applications, and to develop and make tools for privacy friendly
identity management widely available—privacy live”. These are valuable, necessary
R&D steps towards developing technologies that factor in privacy and personal data
protection at the earliest possible stage of design.
However, we argue the need to move beyond discussions about privacy and move
into full fledge discussion of identity in relation to eID. The legal concepts of
13 See http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number6.10/cnil-biometric-passports
14 See, jointly, http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1519208 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/7376608.stm
15 SWIFT, Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunications, http://www.ist-swift.org;
PICOS, Privacy and Identity Management for Community Services, http://www.picos-project.eu;
PRIMELIFE, Privacy and Identity Management In Europe for Life, http://www.primelife.eu/.
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privacy and data protection struggle to regulate citizens’ conduct in the new
information space. Both are remote from people’s practical understanding of the new
environment. They are subject to a well-known paradox (recently, see The Gallup
Organization 2008), whereby people declare to value them highly instants before
selling them cheaply. They are hard to define and enforce, both legally and
practically, in the new complex information space.
Of course, privacy is indispensable to protect the core of citizens’ identity,
sensitive data or the safety of users. People possess an understanding of privacy as a
defensive right to control access to one’s own person and personal information
(Palen and Dourish 2003). Privacy in this sense helps one define the criteria that
would dictate ‘opacity’ of data (Gutwirth 2002) while data protection is defining the
conditions for the ‘transparency’ of data; data protection is indispensable in ensuring
that personal data are processed fairly, efficiently, to the benefit of the user. The Data
Protection Directive framework is successful in ensuring a technology neutral high
level of protection of personal data (European Commission 2007).
However, if privacy and data protection are stretched to intend and regulate zones
of personality that do not require or even invite opacity and procedural fairness, such
as an increasing array of citizen online and offline activities, then they display
visible stretch marks. The current regulatory framework is inefficient in dealing
systematically with the enlarging digital data shadow harboured by the Internet; the
challenges faced by Data Protection authorities in patrolling data controllers’
behaviours point to the natural, one-sided ‘opacity’ of a growing Internet. Further
regulatory mechanisms could prove beneficial in ordering the invisible as well as the
visible transactions involving personal data.
We propose an alternative eID regulation regime to privacy and data protection,
one which we name the Autonomy regulatory framework; Autonomy places different
emphasis on the principles, object, and focus of eID regulation. Data protection and
privacy are not discussed here, as they have been discussed extensively elsewhere in
this journal issue.
In as much as users’ identity is tied to where they go, who they are with, what they
do, who they know, and what they think, the regime has multiple advantages for the
understanding and regulation of eID in turbulent times. Normatively, the new regime
stresses the need to regulate behaviour, rather than procedures or access. Away from
the privacy paradox, what deserves attention is users’ actual behaviour rather than
intentions. Overall, the Autonomy regime may be considered as an enactment of
‘decisional privacy’, whereby citizens can take decisions for themselves and act on
those decisions free from external interference, truly creating a space for autonomous
action (Rössler 2005). It underlines the importance of user control, transparency and
responsibility in relation to personal data in the new environment; these facets of
identity have been long disregarded in the discussion of eID. This does not mean
focusing only on use, quite the contrary; attention is required to structural properties
of a regime based on the praxis of identity, on increased transparency and on
distributed responsibility.
Firstly, regulation is required in the lived domain of actual activities carried out online
which have identity implications. That of identity is a special market, one which requires
closer scrutiny of a larger number of variables. In the new environment, it is hardly
sufficient to balance security and privacy, as convenience, trust, reputation, location,
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transparency and responsibility are crucial variables. The evolution of eID will
ultimately depend on user negotiation and acceptance (Backhouse and Halperin 2007)
of a complex model of regulation of their online and offline eID behaviours. We need
to address the user perspective and regulate extant behaviour as society’s values limit
the practical viability of identity management systems (McKenzie et al. 2008). The
difference between stated preferences and actual practice in relation to privacy has
been documented over time in numerous studies (Acquisti and Varian 2005; Gunther
and Spiekermann 2005).
Secondly, regulation needs to increase the overall transparency of the new
environment, balancing the clear imbalance in favour of data controllers. Transparency
is in line with the call for greater transparency in public policymaking and life,16 and is
consistent with developments in ubiquitous computing (Hildebrandt and Koops 2007).
Also, it works in relation to the configuration of identity in relation new internet
developments such as the Semantic Web and the Internet of things. Two-way
transparency and reciprocity may enhance users’ experience by reducing the gaps
between privacy, personalization and transaction discrimination, beyond the informa-
tion privacy paradigm where this rapprochement has been recently proposed (Acquisti
2008). Finally, increased transparency resolves the tension inherent in the practical
application of different principia of EU regulation: freedom of information and data
protection (Hustinx 2004).
Thirdly, regulation needs to harness responsibility (according to some: account-
ability). The autonomy regime proposed is underpinned by a strong ethos of
personal responsibility, which is in line with recent thinking about personal data
portability, self-regulation of online experience, alternative methods of dispute
resolution and, overall, much greater user control on their own data and experience
(LaRose et al. 2008). More responsibility may have positive behavioural effects.
Young people, who display little to no relationship between online privacy concerns
and information disclosure (Tufekci 2008), adapt intuitively in privacy-oppressive
environments by over-informing their peers about their whereabouts, thinking and
sexual preferences. They adjust profile visibility and use nicknames but do not
restrict information within their profile, with little regard for issues of persistence,
searchability, and cross-indexability (Tufekci 2008). The trick is thus to envisage
(design, regulate) identity environments that capitalise on such propensity to
disclose, bargain, transact. This may have positive economic externalities in
business markets. By stressing accountability, open declarations and users’ duties,
responsibility reduces some of the burden that derive from sub-optimal game results
in an environment where privacy would limit the flow of information.
Conclusions
In this paper we argued that technological developments such as Web2.0 pose novel
challenges for the regulation of eID. We identified and discussed four such challenges:
complexity, uncertainty, responsibility and oversight. Policymakers are only beginning
to address the consequences of these challenges for consumer protection, data
16 Transparency Initiative, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm
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protection and privacy, safety and economic growth and competition. We claimed that
industrial players are increasingly vocal on the issue of privacy; there is a perceivable
movement towards greater industry co-ordination aiming at shielding large prospective
revenues of eID-enabled services from increasing and uncertain regulatory pressure.
This is especially important with an incoming European Commission and forthcoming
European Parliamentary Elections (June 2009).
In this context, we asked whether there is the need for a new regulatory
framework that both preserves users’ identity and enables the provision of advanced
services. We examined the capacity of the current regulatory framework to absorb
this turbulence, and found it wanting. We thus advanced a novel model of eID
regulation, the Autonomy regulatory framework, that may help policymakers create
an identity-preserving, transaction-friendly eID environment.
Overall, effective regulation of the new environment requires putting in place a
range of market-enhancing rather than market-limiting regulations in relation to
advanced interactions in complex, multi-layered digital spaces. Although (or
because) eID industry integration is proceeding at full steam on the privacy track,
led by market players to remove some of system barriers to eID, much more remains
to be done at individual and project level (Maghiros et al. 2007). What may be
required is a set of identity management principles to guide users and companies in
an environment in which the application and policing of data protection principles is
increasingly problematic. Possibly, one could take as a point of departure OECD
privacy principles as received in the Data Protection Directive. Obviously,
significant research is required which envisages and examines the behavioural,
legal and economic consequences of any such alternative regulatory model.
Depending on the results of research based on a relevant set of concepts to the
emerging new environment—user-centricity, transparency and responsibility—a
policy mix of soft-regulation, transparency by design, self-regulation, semiotic
guidance, guide lining, safeguarding, cross-regulation or other regulatory mecha-
nisms of the eID economy may be advisable.
Acknowledgements The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect
those of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of
the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the information and analysis presented.
Appendix
Web2.0 application Logic
eBay Consumer-to-consumer auction site based on user-generated reputation
feedback and comments; identity is chosen and managed, often strategically,
by the seller; recently eBay has tried to tag real-life information to the seller,
to improve trust.
Amazon Market site where users rate and provide feedback on different products;
this is complemented by behavioural tracking of users’ purchase behaviour
and attention; identity is implicit in purchasing/browsing behaviour (culture
of consumption) and further commoditised by the website’s algorithms.
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PatientOpinion Heath system rating site, where patients pass comment on or rate the
performance of public health system practitioners and structures; identity
in this case is related to personal medical information shared with other
users of the system; there are clear concerns for professionals’ privacy
and reputation.
Radio 2.0—Last FM A musical taste-sharing system. More user-centred, it uses a recommendation
system to build profiles of each user’s musical taste based on songs listened
to, linked to a webpage. User can tag, annotate, and share their tastes
via social networking features.
Other Web2.0 platforms such as Linkedin, social networking sites (Facebook, Myspace), WIKIs,
Technorati and GNU (communities of software developers) operate alongside different logics,
concerning identity, trust and privacy.
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